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What Gives You the Right?!-Ne Exeat
Rights Should Constitute Rights of Custody
after Furnes v. Reeves
Kathleen A. O'Connor*
I. Introduction
The word "family" has an ever-changing definition in our society
and societies around the world. In one moment, a family may consist of
a married couple with children or, with more recent frequency, an
unmarried couple with children. However, in the blink of an eye, that
seemingly strong bond may break and thus completely change the
composition. Divorce or separation creates two families in which the
children are often caught in the crossfire. 1  Custody battles and
arguments among the parents subject children to emotional turmoil and
2uncertainty. Children are frequently treated like pawns while their
parents engage in ongoing disputes. In some situations, even where a
court order grants custody or visitation rights to both parents, one parent
prevents the other from seeing or contacting the child or children. An
issue that can have even more significant effects on all parties involved is
child abduction by parents, specifically international child abduction.
Child abductions, international or not, can negatively affect the
psychological and physical well-being of a child.3 Studies reveal that
* J.D. Candidate, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2006; B.A., University of Maryland, College Park, 2000. The author would like to thank
her family, M.J. and friends for all of their love, encouragement and support, especially
over the past three years.
1. Hildy Mauzerall et al., Protecting the Children of High Conflict Divorce: An
Analysis of the Idaho Bench/Bar Committee to Protect Children of High Conflict
Divorce's Report to the Idaho Supreme Court, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 291,292 (1997).
2. Children of divorce are at an increased risk for disruptive disorders, anxiety
disorders, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorders compared to children from intact
families. Additionally, children over the age of ten who have divorced or separated
parents are at an increased risk of substance abuse. Amy L. Stewart, Note, Covenant
Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REv. 509, 518-19 (1999).
3. Deprivation of parental relationships can lead to later anti-social behavior, such
as drug addiction and delinquency. It can also lead to, among others, mistrust and
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children who have been internationally abducted by a parent are at risk
for a multitude of harmful emotional and psychological effects.4 These
include anxiety, grief, rage, difficulty sleeping, rejection of the abducting
parent, and a sense of guilt for not trying to contact the left-behind
parent. 5 International child abduction can also cause distress and other
harmful effects to the parent from whom the child was taken.6
In order to deal with the growing concern in the international
community about child abduction by a parent or guardian,7 in 1980 The
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
("the Convention") was adopted and signed.8 The signatory countries
sought to protect children from the harmful effects of international
abduction and to create uniform procedures for their return to the State of
their "habitual residence." 9  Since the original signing, 10 seventy-five
countries have signed on to the Convention. 1
Each year, the signatory countries handle many cases involving the
international abduction of children. The U.S. is at the top of the charts
for the number of applications it receives for either the return of children
to the U.S. or the return of children to their State of habitual residence
from the U.S. 12 Recently, a handful of Convention cases have made their
depression. See Copertino, Monica Marie, Comment, Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction: An Analysis of Its Efficacy, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L.
715 (citing S. Abrahms, Children in the Crossfire 76 (Atheneum, 1983)).
4. Marilyn Freeman, The Effects and Consequences of International Child
Abduction, 32 FAM. L.Q. 603 (1998).
5. Id. at 608-14.
6. Parents often suffer from anxiety, depression, fear, loss of appetite, and rage.
These reactions can occur regardless of whether the parent was the abductor or left-
behind parent. Id. at 615-16.
7. See John M. Eekelaar, International Child Abduction by Parents, 32 U.
TORONTO L.J. 281 (1982).
8. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.
25, 1980, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (March 26, 1986) [hereinafter Convention].
9. Id. at Preamble.
10. On October 25, 1980, four States signed the Convention: Canada, France,
Greece, and Switzerland. See Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Conference
on Private International Law, 3 Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session 426
(1980) [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report].
11. As of August 20, 2004, the number of Contracting States to the Convention was
75. Status Table on the Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index-en.php?act=
conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Sept. 17, 2005). The U.S. signed the Convention
on December 23, 1981, see H.R. REP. No. 100-525, at *5 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 386 [hereinafter House Report], but it did not enter into force until July 1,
1988, following the enactment of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA), the U.S.' Convention implementation statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611
(2002).
12. In 1999, the U.S. handled almost 400 applications for return, more than any
other State. Nigel Lowe, et al., Country Report: U.S. (2002), at
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way to the U.S. Courts of Appeals over an issue that is not specifically
covered in the Convention.' 3 Under the Convention, for the return of a
child to be warranted, a parent's "rights of custody" must have been
violated.' 4 The Convention does not precisely define "rights of custody"
but only states what they shall include.1 5  The issue in the courts is
whether a parent's court-ordered right to give or withhold consent to the
child being removed from the State of habitual residence by the other
parent (a "ne exeat" right)16 is a "custody right" under the Convention,
thus making removal without consent "wrongful" under the
Convention.17
In November 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to a
case involving this issue. 18  In 2002, Thomas Fumes, a Norwegian
citizen, submitted an application in the U.S. for the return of his
daughter, Jessica, to Norway, which was her State of habitual
residence. 19 Mr. Fumes's ex-wife Pamela Reeves, a U.S. citizen, took
their daughter from Norway to the U.S. on what he thought was a
vacation. He later discovered, when the pair did not return at the agreed
time, that Ms. Reeves intended to stay in the U.S. with Jessica.2 ° Under a
http://www.missingkids.com/enUS/publications/UnitedStatesE.pdf (last visited Sept.
30, 2005).
13. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002), Croll v. Croll, 229
F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
14. "The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where (a) it
is in a breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other
body...; and (b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually
exercised." Convention, supra note 8, art. 3.
15. "Rights of custody shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the
child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence."
Convention, supra note 9, art. 5. The Hague Convention on Private International Law
Special Commission reports opine that this non-exhaustive definition of "rights of
custody" was purposeful because each legal system has its own language and views of
what constitutes custody rights. Looking to the content of the rights and not their name
was the intent. See Overall Conclusions of the Special Commission of October 1989 on
the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, (1989), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 219, 222 (1990)
[hereinafter Hague Commission Overall Conclusions]; see also Report of the Second
Special Commission Meeting to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, (1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 225, 233
(1994) [hereinafter Second Commission Meeting].
16. "Ne Exeat" or "that he not depart" (Latin) is an "equitable writ restraining a
person from leaving, or removing a child or property from, the jurisdiction. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (8th ed. 2004).
17. See Croll, 229 F.3d at 136.
18. The Supreme Court denied Pamela Reeves's petition for certiorari on November
8, 2004. Reeves v. Fumes, 125 S. Ct. 478 (2004).
19. Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 709 (1 1th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Reeves v.
Fumes, 125 S. Ct. 478 (2004).
20. Id. at 708.
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settlement agreement approved by the Norwegian courts, Ms. Reeves
was not to move abroad with Jessica without the consent of Mr. Fumes. 21
Mr. Fumes's petition for his daughter's return alleged that Ms. Reeves
had violated his custody rights, making Jessica's removal to the U.S.
wrongful under the language of the Convention.22 The district court in
Atlanta, Georgia denied Mr. Fumes's petition, but the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Mr. Fumes's ne exeat right was a "right of
custody" under the Convention, and Ms. Reeves violated those rights.23
This decision by the Eleventh Circuit represents one half of the split
amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeals that have addressed the ne exeat
right issue.24 Ms. Reeves appealed the decision; however, the Supreme
Court denied her petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court's decision in
Fumes v. Reeves would have had a significant impact on the way that the
U.S., and possibly the way other Contracting States, implements the
objectives of the Convention.
This Comment discusses the recent history of the "ne exeat right as
a custody right" issue, and offers an analysis of why the Court should
have heard Fumes v. Reeves and ruled in favor of "rights of custody" as
including ne exeat rights. Part II of this Comment presents a brief
overview of the Convention, from the reasons for its adoption almost
twenty-five years ago to how it is viewed by the international community
today. Part II will also examine, in short, the Convention's
implementing legislation in the U.S., the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA). Part III will then explore the circuit split in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals and how it compares to the views of the courts of
sister signatories. Finally, Part IV explains why the Court should have
heard the case and decided that a ne exeat right, or a right to determine
whether the child or children may relocate outside the State of habitual
residence, is a "right of custody" under the Convention, thus making
removal without consent grounds for return.
II. Hague Convention
At the time of the Convention's inception, there was evidence that
21. Under a settlement agreement approved by the Norwegian courts, Mr. Fumes
and Ms. Reeves had "joint parental responsibility" over Jessica. Because Jessica lived
with her mother, Ms. Reeves had decision-making authority over important aspects of the
child's care. However, under Norwegian law, a parent with "joint parental
responsibility" has decision-making authority over whether the child lives outside
Norway. See id. at 708 (citing Norwegian Children Act, No. 3, §§ 35(b), 40).
22. Id. at 709.
23. Id. at 724.
24. See, e.g., Croll, 229 F.3d at 135 ("access" or visitation rights coupled with a ne
exeat right do not constitute rights of custody); Fumes, 362 F.3d at 724 (ne exeat rights
amount to custody rights under the Convention).
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international child abduction by parents was on the rise.25 Several
countries and the Hague Conference on Private International Law
recognized the deficiencies in the law.26 A device was needed to correct
these problems and to protect the interests of children. Thus, the
Convention was drafted and adopted to create a cooperative effort to
provide for the timely return of children wrongfully removed or retained
and to ensure that rights of custody and access in one Contracting State
were respected in other Contracting States.27
Essentially, the Convention attempts to provide a uniform
international mechanism by which a child who is removed to or retained
in any Contracting State in violation of rights of custody will be
promptly returned to the child's state of habitual residence. 28 Although
the Convention's title includes the term "abduction," and the term
"custody" is used throughout the text of the Convention, the Convention
neither seeks to cover the criminal aspects of child abduction nor to
regulate custody issues.29 It merely seeks to create a system of
cooperation to ensure that its objectives, to restore the status quo, are
fulfilled.30
A. Major Provisions of the Convention
1. General Scope of the Convention
The first of the Convention's six chapters is devoted to the
objectives and scope of the Convention. Securing the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to or retained in a Contracting State and
ensuring the respect of custody and access rights under the laws of
Contacting States are the objectives enumerated in Article 1.31 With
these objectives in mind, the remainder of the first chapter seeks to
define who and what these objectives encompass. To ensure the prompt
return of wrongfully removed or retained children, Article 2 charges
25. See John M. Eekelaar, International Child Abduction by Parents, 32 U.
TORONTo L.J. 281, 306 (1982).
26. The United Kingdom recognized a lack of mutual enforcement arrangements
between countries, a lack of mechanisms to locate abducted children, and a lack of legal
aid in proceedings overseas. A.E. Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction, 30 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 537-38 (1981).
27. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 10, at 435. See also House Report, supra note 11
at 5 (explaining Convention reflects worldwide concern about harmful effects of parental
abductions and need for effective deterrent to such conduct.).
28. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1, 3. In addition, the Convention protects rights
of access, generally described as visitation rights.
29. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 10, at 430, 441.
30. Id. at 435.
31. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1.
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Contracting States to act expeditiously in their efforts by employing all
appropriate measures available to them.32
However, before the Contracting States can put these speedy
procedures into action to secure the return of the child, a judicial or
administrative authority in the Contracting State must determine that the
removal or retention was "wrongful, 33 and that the Convention applies to
the child at issue.3 4  The chapter concludes with what "rights of
custody"'35 and "rights of access' 36 may include, serving as a guide for
Contracting States to ensure that the two rights are respected as intended
by the Convention.
2. Central Authorities
Close cooperation among the Contracting States is an essential
element in the success of the Convention. Therefore, to channel that
cooperation, each Contracting State must designate a Central Authority
to implement the expeditious procedures emphasized in Article 2.3' The
Central Authorities must cooperate with each other and promote
cooperation amongst the authorities in their respective Contracting States
to fulfill the objectives of the Convention.38 Persons or institutions
claiming the wrongful removal or retention of a child may apply to either
the Contracting State of the child's habitual residence or to any other
Contracting State for assistance in obtaining the return of the child.39
Once the application is received, the requested Central Authority is
32. Id. at art. 2.
33. Id. at art. 3. The removal or retention is wrongful if it violates joint or sole
custody rights under the laws of the child's State of habitual residence and the holder of
such rights was actually exercising or would have been exercising them but for the
removal or retention. The custody rights may arise by operation of law, by reason of a
judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under
the law of that State.
34. Id. at art. 4. The Convention only applies to a child or children under the age of
16 who were habitually residing in a Contracting State immediately prior to the violation.
35. Id. at art. 5. Defining rights of custody, at the heart of this Comment, has proved
to be a difficult task for many judicial and administrative authorities that have attempted
to do so. The Convention merely provides a starting point for Contracting States because
it only provides what "rights of custody" shall include.
36. Id. See also Chapter 4. Although securing and maintaining rights of access is an
integral part of the Convention, it will not be addressed at length in this Comment.
Because the case in which this Comment seeks to analyze deals with whether a certain
right is a "right of custody" within the meaning of the Convention, the focus will remain
on the "custody" concept.
37. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6. The Office of Citizens' and Consular Affairs
of the Bureau of Consular Affairs within the Department of State is the Central Authority
of the U.S. The list of Central Authorities is available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/
index-en.php?acttconventions.authorities&cid=24 (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
38. Id. at art. 7.
39. Id. atart. 8.
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charged with acting expeditiously to achieve the objectives of the
Convention. It does so by implementing appropriate measures to,
amongst other things, discover the whereabouts of the child, prevent
further harm to the child, and to initiate or facilitate the institution of
judicial or administrative proceedings.4 °
Once proceedings are initiated in the judicial or administrative
authorities within the Contracting State, those authorities are to act
expeditiously to determine the disposition of the issue.4 1 Any decision of
a judicial or administrative authority is not to be considered a
determination on the merits of any custody issue,42 and no decision shall
be made on the merits of custody until the tribunal determines that the
child is not to be returned.43
3. Exceptions to Return of the Child
If a judicial or administrative authority within a Contracting State
determines that the child was wrongfully removed or retained in breach
of rights of custody, the authority shall order the return of the child.44
However, the Convention lists several exceptions that may prevent the
return of the child regardless of the wrongfulness of the removal or
retention. It is important to bear in mind that, although the Convention
offers these exceptions to the return of a wrongfully removed or retained
child, the judicial or administrative authority retains the power and
discretion to order return at any time.45
First, if the proceedings were commenced more than one year after
the removal or retention and the abductor is able to show that the child is
settled in its new environment, the authority may withhold return of the
child.4 6 Second, if the abductor is able to show that the petitioner was
40. Id. at art. 7(a)-(i). The Central Authorities shall also take all appropriate
measures to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable
resolution of the issues, to exchange information relating to the social background of the
child and to the general character of the law of their State, to provide or facilitate legal
aid and advice, to provide arrangements for the safe return of the child, and to keep each
other informed with respect to the operation of the Convention.
41. Id. at art. 11.
42. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 19.
43. Id. at art. 16.
44. Id. at art. 12.
45. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 18.
46. See id. The judicial or administrative authority is not bound to refuse the return
of the child under these circumstances. The burden of proof is on the abductor to show
that the child has settled in his or her new environment. It has been determined that
nothing less than substantial evidence of settlement will suffice. See Public Notice 957:
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg.
10494, 10509 (March 26, 1986) [hereinafter Public Notice 957]. Additionally, there has
been much debate over when the one-year period begins within which the petitioner must
2005]
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not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of the removal or
retention, had consented to or acquiesced in the removal or retention, or
that there is a grave risk that return would subject the child to physical or
psychological harm, the tribunal is not bound to order return of the
child.47 Third, return of the child may be refused if to do so "would not
be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating
to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 4a
B. International Child Abduction Remedies Act
The Convention is only the fourth Hague Convention and the first
family law Convention to which the U.S. has become a party.49
Although the Convention is thorough and self-executing, 50 the House
Advisory Committee and the Department of State felt that
implementation would prove more operative through legislation that
would give full effect to certain provisions of the Convention.51
Therefore, the provisions of the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act (ICARA) 52 established judicial and administrative procedures for the
implementation of the Convention in the U.S.53
Before delineating any procedures, ICARA reemphasizes the
commence proceedings. The position of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law seems to be that the period begins when the petitioner discovers that the removal or
retention is wrongful. See Second Commission Meeting, supra note 15 at 239. However,
with regard to the case in which the abductor secrets the child from the petitioner, some
American courts have held that the one-year period is tolled until the petitioner discovers
the whereabouts of the child. See, e.g., Fumes, 362 F.3d at 723; Mendez Lynch v.
Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1362-63 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
47. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13. Here again, the burden of proof is on the
abductor to show the exceptions enumerated in this article. See Public Notice 957, supra
note 46 at 10510.
48. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 20. To invoke this exception, the abducting
parent must show that the fundamental principles of the requested State concerning the
Convention do not permit return of the child. See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 10 at
462. This clause seems to have been included to deal with the views of those who felt
that the Convention should have a public policy clause. Richard D. Kearney,
Developments in Private International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 731 (1987). In
addition, the reports of the Hague Convention on Private International Law advise against
use of the exception under Article 20 because it gives rise to problems and suggest that
Article 20 is covered by Article 13. See Second Commission Meeting, supra note 15 at
243.
49. Nigel Lowe, et al., Country Report: U.S. (2002), at http://www.missingkids.com/
enUS/publications/UnitedStatesE.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
50. Richard D. Kearney, Developments in Private International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 724, 734 (1987).
51. House Report, supra note 11 at *6.
52. The provisions of ICARA are in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of
the Convention. 42 U.S.C. § 1160 1(b)(2).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(1).
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Convention's premise that the judicial and administrative authorities are
to determine only the rights under the Convention and "not the merits of
any underlying child custody claims., 54 Once the procedures under the
Convention are completed, the courts may then proceed to adjudicate the
merits of underlying custody claims. After defining certain key
terms,56 ICARA grants concurrent original jurisdiction to both State
courts and the U.S. district courts over Convention actions.57 A
petitioner must file a Convention claim in either the State court or U.S.
district court that may exercise its jurisdiction "in the place where the
child is located at the time the petition is filed.",
58
ICARA clearly defines the burdens of proof on both the petitioner
and respondent in Convention actions.59 The petitioner, or left-behind
parent, must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that in an
action for return of the child, the child was wrongfully removed or
retained under the Convention.6° In such an action, the respondent, or
the alleged abducting parent, must prove: "(A) by clear and convincing
evidence that one of the exceptions set forth in Article 13b or 20 of the
Convention applies; and (B) by a preponderance of the evidence that any
other exception set forth in Article 12 or 13 of the Convention applies. 61
Thus, the respondent parent has a higher burden of proof, under certain
circumstances, to prevent the return of the child to the State of habitual
residence.62 These provisions seem to level the playing field for the
petitioner parent who will often have to bring the action on the abducting
parent's "home court.,
6 3
A few additional provisions warrant recognition. In particular, once
a court orders or denies the return of a child, the decision shall be given
full faith and credit by the state and federal courts.64 Additionally,
ICARA establishes that the functions of the Central Authority are those
outlined in the Convention 65 and authorizes the Central Authority to
54. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4).
55. House Report, supra note 11, at * 10.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 11602.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A). In an action to organize or secure access rights, an
issue not emphasized in this Comment, the petitioner must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that he or she has such rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1 1603(e)(1)(B).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A)-(B).
62. See House Report, supra note 11, at * 12.
63. Copertino, Monica Marie, Comment, Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction: An Analysis of its Efficacy, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 715, 728
(1991).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 11606(b).
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issue regulations66 and enter into agreements as may be necessary to
carry out its responsibilities.67
III. The Circuit Split and Other Contracting States' Views
As noted previously, the U.S. is the Contracting State with the
highest number of applications for either the return of a child to the U.S.
or return of a child to another Contracting State.68 Within the past eight
years, a handful of the applications have made their way to the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals on the issue of whether a ne exeat right
constitutes a "right of custody" under the Convention.69 Unfortunately,
the Circuit Courts do not completely agree on the answer to this
question. Most of the Circuit Courts that have weighed in on the issue
hold that a ne exeat right is not a custody right,7 ° while the Eleventh
Circuit recently held that it is.
7 1
This discrepancy also exists internationally. Courts in the United
Kingdom, Australia, and South Africa have ordered the return of children
where the removal was in violation of a ne exeat right.72 However,
courts in Canada have held that violation of a ne exeat right does not
constitute wrongful removal under the Convention.73
A. Circuit Cases
1. Ne Exeat Rights Do Not Constitute Custody Rights
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have all
held that a parent's possession of a ne exeat right is not synonymous with
a "right of custody." Therefore, violation of a ne exeat right does not
constitute wrongful removal under the Convention.74 All three courts
concluded that a ne exeat right serves only as a limitation on the
custodial parent's right to remove the child from the State of habitual
66. 42 U.S.C. § 11606(c).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 11606(e).
68. Supra note 10.
69. See, e.g., Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v.
Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
70. See, e.g., Croll, 229 F.3d at 143; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 714(11th Cir. 2004).
72. See, e.g., C v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654,658 (Eng. C.A. 1989); In the Marriage of: Jose
Garcia Resina Appellant/Husband and Muriel Ghislaine Henriette Resina
Respondent/Wife, [No. 52] (1991) (Austl. Fam.), P 26; Sonderup v. Tondelli, 2000(1)
Constitutional Court of South Africa 1171 (CC).
73. See, e.g., Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 (Can.); D.S. v. V.W.
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 108 (Can.).
74. See Fawcett, 326 F.3d 491; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 942; Croll, 229 F.3d 133.
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residence.75
a. Croll v. Croll
The leading case in support of this conclusion is Croll v. Croll.7 6 In
Croll, the mother removed the child from Hong Kong to the U.S.
7 7
Under a custody order, the mother had custody, care, and control of the
child, while the father had rights of "reasonable" access.78 In addition,
the child was not to be removed from Hong Kong until she attained
majority without leave of court or consent from the other parent.79 The
father argued that this ne exeat clause granted him the right to "determine
the child's place of residence" under the Convention, thus creating a
"right of custody" and making the child's removal "wrongful." 80 The
court disagreed and held that the ne exeat clause of the custody order is
merely a veto power that may be exercised against the mother's right to
determine the child's place of residence.8' The court felt that
"determining" a child's place of residence indicated an active power to
choose such things as whether the child lives in a city or suburb, at home,
or in a boarding school.82 Thus, the ne exeat right falls short of
conferring a custody right because it does not include these "active"
responsibilities. 
83
b. Gonzalez v. Gutierrez
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal used the reasoning in Croll to
75. Croll, 229 F.3d at 139; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 949; Fawcett, 326 F.3d at 500.
76. 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
77. Id. at 135.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 139. Under Article 5(a) of the Convention, "fights of custody" shall
include "the right to determine the child's place of residence." Convention, supra note 8,
at art. 5(a).
81. Croll,229F.3dat 139-40.
82. Id. at 139.
83. Id. The court arrived at this decision by consulting the language and purpose of
the Convention and the intent of the drafters. Id. at 136. Because the remedy of return is
only available to those individuals with "rights of custody" under the Convention, the
court turned to several dictionaries to find the ordinary meaning of "custody." Id. at 138.
The definitions reflected a duty of care, maintenance, to choose and give shelter,
guidance, education, etc. Id. Based on this, the court concluded that a ne exeat right, or a
mere veto power, falls short of these rights. Id. at 139. The court felt this conclusion was
consistent with the intent of the drafters of the Convention because the chair of the Hague
Conference Commission that drafted the Convention wrote that the power to prohibit exit
did not rise to the level of the custodial "bundle of rights" and because the official
reporter to the Convention noted the importance of separate remedies to enforce access
rights versus custodial rights. Id. at 141-42.
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come to the same conclusion regarding ne exeat rights.84 In Gonzalez v.
Gutierrez, the mother removed her two children from Mexico to the U.S.
after suffering physical, emotional, and sexual abuse at the hands of the
children's father.85 Under the divorce agreement, the mother had
custody and care of both children, while the father had visitation and ne
86exeat rights. Just as the father argued in Croll, Mr. Gonzalez argued
that the ne exeat clause granted him a right of custody because it
constituted the right to determine his children's place of residence.87
However, the court in Gonzalez followed a similar line of reasoning as in
Croll in holding that a ne exeat clause does not amount to a "right of
custody" under the Convention but is, at most, a veto power that merely
imposes a limitation on the custodial parent's right to remove the child
from the State of habitual residence. 88 As in Croll, the court concluded
that a ne exeat clause does not include an active or affirmative right to
determine a child's residence.89 It is merely a "condition to protect [the
non-custodial parent's] access rights, and no more."
90
c. Fawcett v. McRoberts
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion
with regard to this issue. In Fawcett v. McRoberts,91 the father removed
84. Fawcett, 326 F.3d 491; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 942.
85. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 946 (abuse occurred both before and after mother obtained
divorce from a Jalisco family court).
86. Under the agreement, Mr. Gonzalez was able to see his children every week on
Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays for three hours each. In addition, he had visitation
rights every other weekend and could take them on vacation for two weeks per year. The
parties agreed that Mr. Gonzalez's ne exeat rights were to be construed as prohibiting Ms.
Gutierrez from taking the children out of Mexico without Mr. Gonzalez's permission. Id.
at 947.
87. Id. at 949.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 950. The court went through a similar analysis of the language and
purpose of the Convention, its drafting history, and post-ratification understanding. Id. at
948. As described above, the court concluded that to read a ne exeat clause as amounting
to a right of custody would be inconsistent with the text because it does not affirmatively
determine a child's place of residence. Id. at 949. The court felt its conclusion fulfilled
the purposes of the Convention (to protect children from the harmful effects of removal
and to secure their return, as well as to protect access rights) because it was consistent
with the distinction the Convention recognizes between custody and access rights. Id. at
950. In other words, because the return remedy is only available when a child is
wrongfully removed in violation of custody rights, and because a ne exeat clause does not
amount to a custody right, return of a child is not the appropriate remedy. Id. The court
did not find substantial guidance from case law subsequent to the ratification of the
Convention; therefore, it relied on the aforementioned tools of guidance. Id. at 954.
91. Fawcett, 326 F.3d491.
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the child to the U.S. from Scotland.92 Under the divorce decree between
Mr. McRoberts and Ms. Fawcett, Mr. McRoberts had custody of the
couple's son, and Ms. Fawcett had contact and visitation rights.93 Ms.
Fawcett also had ne exeat rights that were statutorily granted under the
Children Scotland Act.94 As the petitioners did in Croll and Gonzalez,
Ms. Fawcett argued that the statute gave her the right to determine her
son's place of residence, thus granting her "rights of custody" under the
Convention.95 Persuaded by the reasoning from Croll and Gonzalez that
a ne exeat clause only grants a veto power, the court held that the
Children Scotland Act did not confer "rights of custody. 96
2. Ne Exeat Rights Do Constitute Custody Rights
Thus far, the only U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that has held
contrary to the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits' holdings is the
Eleventh Circuit. In March of 2004, the Eleventh Circuit held that a
parent with ne exeat rights does have custody rights as they are defined
in the Hague Convention. 97 Therefore, when a child is removed from a
parent with such rights, the removal is "wrongful" under the terms of the
Convention, and the child must be returned to the state of habitual
residence.
98
Tom Fumes, a citizen and resident of Norway, and Pamela Reeves,
a citizen and resident of the U.S., were married in 1994 and resided in
Norway. 99 Their only child, Jessica, born in 1998, was the child
removed in this case.'00 A little over a year after Jessica was born, the
parties separated, and in 2001 they came to an agreement regarding
custody.' 0 1 The agreement stipulated that the parties would have "joint
92. Id. at 492.
93. Ms. Fawcett was allowed contact with the child on weekends and at other
specified times. She was also granted contact for two weeks during the summer and one
week during each of the October, Christmas, and Easter holidays. Id.
94. Under Section 2(3) of the Children Scotland Act, "no person shall be entitled to
remove a child habitually resident in Scotland from, or to retain any such child outwith,
the United Kingdom without the consent of a person described in subsection (6). Id. at
499. Subsection (6) applied to Ms. Fawcett because she was a person who was
exercising the right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the child on a
regular basis. Id.
95. Id. at 499.
96. The court concluded that the Children Scotland Act served only as a limitation
on the custodial parent's rights. Id. at 500.
97. Fumes, 362 F.3d at 710.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 704.
100. Id.
101. The parties separated in 1999. After the separation, they were unable to agree on
custody. Pamela Reeves retained custody of Jessica. The separation was riddled with
conflict. Ms. Reeves thwarted Tom Fumes's attempts to visit Jessica on several
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parental responsibility" for Jessica under Norwegian law; Jessica would
live with Ms. Reeves; and Mr. Fumes would have access to Jessica on
certain days and times. 0 2 Later that year, Ms. Reeves asked for Mr.
Fumes's permission to take Jessica to the U.S. for the summer. Mr.
Fumes agreed with the understanding and expectation that Jessica would
return to Norway at the end of the summer. 10 3 When Jessica did not
return, Mr. Fumes began relentless efforts to determine the whereabouts
of his daughter.
10 4
In November of 2002, Mr. Fumes filed a Petition for Return of
Child to Petitioner under ICARA in the district court in Atlanta,
Georgia. 105 The district court concluded that Mr. Fumes did not have
custody rights, only access rights coupled with a ne exeat right;
therefore, the court was not authorized to return Jessica to Norway. 0 6 In
reviewing the district court's decision and in holding that a ne exeat right
is a custody right entitling Mr. Fumes to the return of his daughter, the
occasions and made allegations that Mr. Fumes abused Ms. Reeves and poisoned Jessica.
These allegations were later found to be groundless. Ms. Reeves was later charged with
arson and insurance fraud after there was a fire in her home (the former joint home). In
August of 1999, a Norwegian court granted custody of Jessica to Mr. Fumes, finding that
Ms. Reeves was the primary contributor to the conflict and that this had a negative effect
on her ability to care for Jessica. The court found Mr. Reeves to be the best suited person
to care for Jessica. Ms. Reeves appealed the decision, but the parties reached the
aforementioned agreement and the appeal was dismissed. Id. at 704-05.
102. Fumes, 362 F.3d at 706. Because Mr. Fumes and Ms. Reeves had "joint
parental responsibility," Mr. Fumes had ne exeat rights. Under Norwegian law, if the
parents have joint parental responsibility, "both of them must consent to the child moving
abroad." Id. at 708 (citing Norwegian Children Act, No. 3, § 43).
103. Id. at 708.
104. Mr. Fumes's search began in Bergen and Oslo, Norway. He made repeated
attempts to telephone and write Ms. Reeves, but received no response. He contacted Ms.
Reeves's sister and brother-in-law in Oslo, but they were of no assistance. In March of
2002, Mr. Fumes filed a police report with the Bergen Police. When the Norwegian
authorities informed Mr. Fumes that it was probable that Jessica was no longer in
Norway and that there was not much more they could do, he filed a petition for Jessica's
return with the Norwegian Ministry of Justice. In August of that year, Mr. Fumes
traveled to Tampa, Florida and Atlanta, Georgia to search for Jessica because he was
informed that Ms. Reeves might be living in or around these locations. Id. at 708.
105. The petition alleged that Ms. Reeves wrongfully removed Jessica from Norway,
violating Mr. Fumes's joint custody rights. It sought Jessica's return under Article 12 of
the Hague Convention. Id. at 709. Article 12 specifies that where a child has been
wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3, Convention, supra note 9 at art. 3,
and "at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or
administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than
one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority
concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith." Id. at art. 12. Although more
than a year had elapsed between Jessica's removal and the date the proceedings
commenced, both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit held that the limitation
period was equitably tolled until Mr. Fumes located Jessica because Ms. Reeves had
secreted Jessica's whereabouts. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723.
106. Id. at 709.
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Eleventh Circuit considered Norwegian law as it related to the
Convention,' °7 international cases, 10 8 and the conclusions of the Second
Circuit in Croll v. Croll.109
Under Norwegian law, individuals with joint parental responsibility
have the right and duty to make decisions for the child in personal
matters.1 0 Therefore, Mr. Fumes would have custody rights, or rights
that relate to the care of the person of the child, as they are defined in the
Convention."' However, where the child lives with one parent, the other
parent may not object to the parent with whom the child lives making
decisions relating to important aspects of the child's care, including
where in Norway the child will live (emphasis added). 1 2 Despite this
limiting language, the court determined that Mr. Fumes retained the right
to make certain "decisions for the child in personal matters," and that
some of these rights included rights "relating to the care of the person of
the child" under the Convention."
13
Separate and apart from having custody rights within the meaning
of the Convention through Section 30 of the Children Act, the court held
that Mr. Fumes had the requisite type of custody rights within the
meaning of the Convention through his ne exeat rights. 14 Because one
of the purposes of the Convention is to curtail international parental child
abduction, a right to give or withhold consent to the child living outside
of Norway is a right to "determine the child's place of residence" under
the Convention.' 15 The Convention is "intended to restore the status
107. Id.at710.
108. Id. at 717. The international cases will be discussed in Section IIIB of this
Comment.
109. Id. at 719.
110. Norwegian Children Act, No. 3, § 30 [hereinafter Children Act].
111. See Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(a).
112. Children Act, supra note 110, § 35(b).
113. The court focused on the difference in language between sections 30 and 35(b)
of the Children Act. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 714. If the Norwegian legislature intended to
do away with all of the rights of the parent with whom the child does not live through
section 35(b), it would have used the same language as used in section 30. Id. Instead,
the legislature chose to only specify that the parent with whom the child does not live
could not object to decisions regarding important aspects of the child's care. Id. Thus,
because Mr. Fumes had the right, under Norwegian law, to make certain decisions for the
child in personal matters, he had the ability to make decisions relating to the care of the
person of the child under Article 5 of the Convention. Id.
114. Id. As stated previously, Mr. Fumes's ne exeat rights stemmed from his "joint
parental responsibilities" via his custody agreement with Ms. Reeves. Section 43 of the
Children Act provides that if the parents have joint parental responsibility, both of them
must consent to the child moving abroad. Children Act, supra note 110, § 43.
115. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 715. The court noted that Mr. Fumes's right whether or not
to consent to Jessica living outside of Norway also bestows on him the authority to
ensure, should he desire, that Jessica speak Norwegian, go to school in Norway, and
participate in the Norwegian culture. These all significantly relate to the care of the
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quo."' 1 6  The court concluded that its decision to return Jessica to
Norway best served this purpose because it respected the parties' rights
and the agreement approved by the Norwegian courts.'
17
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that its decision was in direct
contrast to the decisions of the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. 1 ' In
disagreeing with the majority opinion, the court focused on the
conclusions and reasoning of the Second Circuit in Croll v. Croll.1 19 The
court in Furnes argued that the court in Croll incorrectly concluded that
the ne exeat right was only a limitation on the custodial parent's right to
determine the child's place of residence. 120  In Croll, the mother was
given sole custody, care, and control of the child; thus, the court
concluded she had the sole ability to determine the child's place of
residence. 1 2' However, the Furnes court pointed out, this conclusion
ignored the fact that the Convention states that custody rights may be
exercised jointly or alone.
122
The Fumes court found additional flaws in the Croll court's
reasoning-it mistakenly assumed both that a ne exeat right could only
be exercised to prevent a wrongful removal 23 and that conferring "rights
of custody" in a ne exeat right could compel a court to return a child to
an irresponsible or unfit parent. 124 However, the Furnes court concluded,
a ne exeat right may be exercised in the absence of wrongful removal,
especially where the custodial parent actually requests permission from
person of the child. Id. at 716.
116. Id. at 717 (citing Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996)).
117. Id.
118. Id.at719.
119. Id. As stated previously, in Croll the Second Circuit held that the father's ne
exeat rights were not custody rights within the meaning of the Convention, but only a
veto power on the mother's right to determine the child's place of residence. Croll v.
Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits had essentially adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit.
Fumes, 362 F.3d at 719.
120. Fumes, 362 F.3d at 719.
121. Croll, 229 F.3d at 139-40.
122. Mr. Fumes's rights were even stronger than the father's in Croll. Unlike the
father in Croll, Mr. Fumes had "joint parental responsibility" for decisions relating to
personal matters. The court interpreted the agreement between Mr. Fumes and Ms.
Reeves as granting Mr. Fumes the right to share decision-making authority with Ms.
Reeves. Fumes, 362 F.3d at 720.
123. Id. The ne exeat right was not "actually exercised," as required by the
Convention in order for the removal to be wrongful, nor was it something that could have
been exercised but for the child's removal, because a ne exeat right deals with nothing
but removal. Croll, 229 F.3d at 140.
124. Id. The Croll court held that conferring such rights on a non-custodial parent
with a ne exeat right could conceivably compel return of a child to either a parent with no
previous duty to give care to the child or to a parent with access rights who has been
found unfit to have custody. Id. at 141.
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the non-custodial parent to move abroad with the child.12 5 Additionally,
creating "rights of custody" in a ne exeat right does not compel return of
a child to a parent without previous responsibility or to an unfit parent
because custody agreements or rights are not altered by return of the
child. 126  Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit opined that, because the
Convention is intended to prevent international child abduction, the Croll
court's interpretation of a ne exeat right would have the opposite effect
and thwart that intent. 27 Thus, the court concluded that Ms. Reeves
wrongfully removed Jessica from Norway in violation of Mr. Fumes's
rights of custody under the Convention. 128
B. International Cases
The majority of signatory countries that have addressed the ne exeat
right issue have concluded that such rights constitute custody rights
within the meaning of the Convention. 129 The Eleventh Circuit
recognized that its reasoning and conclusions were in harmony with
these decisions.1 30  A leading case that several subsequent cases have
followed is C. v. C. in which the mother removed the child to England
from Australia. 131 The Court of Appeals of England concluded that the
father's right to give or withhold consent to removal was a right of
custody within the meaning of the Convention because it was a right to
determine the child's place of residence. 132 The court determined that
this interpretation was in harmony with the Convention's stated
125. Fumes, 362 F.3d at 720.
126. Id. at 721. Once back in the state of habitual residence, the custodial parent may
petition the court to remove the ne exeat clause from the agreement. Additionally, where
there is a risk that return of the child would be damaging, the Convention provides for an
exception to return. Even so, in this case, Jessica would not be returned to a parent
without previous responsibility to care for her or to an unfit parent. Mr. Fumes had
existing duties under the agreement and Norwegian law and was found to be better able
to care and provide for Jessica than Ms. Reeves. Id. at 721-22.
127. Id.at721.
128. The court ordered the district court to grant Mr. Fumes's ICARA petition and to
order Ms. Reeves to return Jessica to Norway. Id. at 724.
129. See e.g., C v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng. C.A. 1989); Sonderup v. Tondelli, 2000(1)
Constitutional Court of South Africa 1171 (CC); In the Marriage of: Jose Garcia Resina
Appellant/Husband and Muriel Ghislaine Henriette Resina Respondent/Wife, [No. 52]
(1991) (Austl. Fam.); C.C. (T.A.) 2898/92.
130. "The U.S. Supreme Court has established that in interpreting the language of
treaties, 'we find the opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled to considerable
weight."' Fumes, 362 F.3d at 717 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985)).
131. The mother and father had joint guardianship under Australian law, however the
mother had physical custody. The Australian consent order provided that neither parent
could remove the child from Australia without the other's consent. In other words, both
parents had ne exeat rights. C v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng. C.A. 1989).
132. Id.
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purposes.1
33
Australia and South Africa followed suit with cases that also
conclude that ne exeat rights constitute rights of custody under the
Convention. 134 In Resina, the court essentially adopted the rule from C.
v. C. 135 and gave its own reasons for adopting such an interpretation of
rights of custody. 136  In Sonderup, the court similarly held that the
mother's removal of the child breached the father's ne exeat rights,
making removal wrongful. 137  The court noted that several other
jurisdictions had also held that non-removal or ne exeat provisions could
confer a right of custody.'
1 38
Canada, on the other hand, takes a different view. The Supreme
Court of Canada in Thomson v. Thomson' 39 addressed the issue of
whether the mother wrongfully removed the child from Scotland to
Canada in violation of rights of custody under the Convention. 140 The
court answered yes and concluded that a non-removal clause could be
placed in an interim order of custody to preserve jurisdiction, and in the
course of exercising that jurisdiction, the court was exercising rights of
133. Id.
134. Resina, [No. 52] (1991) (Austl. Fam.); Sonderup, 2000(1) Constitutional Court
of South Africa 1171 (CC).
135. The parties in this case were born in France but lived and acquired citizenship in
Australia. Resina [No. 52] (1991) (Austl. Fam.), P 3. There were two children that were
the subject of the dispute. However, the older child was not one of the maniage.
Nonetheless, the ne exeat clause of the relevant custody order regarded both children. Id.
at PP 2, 4. The children's maternal grandparents took them to France, and the mother
soon after joined them. Id. at P 5.
136. The court adopted the rule that a ne exeat clause constituted rights of custody
within the meaning of the Convention because doing so provided uniformity of
interpretation and was in conformity with the "spirit" of the Convention to ensure that
wrongfully removed children are promptly returned to the state of habitual residence so
that "their future can properly be determined within that society." Id. at P 26.
137. The mother in this case removed the child from Canada to South Africa after she
and her husband separated. Sonderup, 2000(1) Constitutional Court of South Africa
1171, P 8 (CC). Under an order of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the parties
shared joint guardianship with the mother having sole custody and the father having
rights of access. In addition, the order provided that neither the mother nor the father
could remove the child from British Columbia without a court order or written agreement
of the parties. Id. at P 6.
138. The court also remarked that the majority opinion in Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133
(2d Cir. 2000) was against the weight of authority with regard to this issue. Sonderup,
2000(1) Constitutional Court of South Africa 1171 P 22 (CC).
139. Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 (Can.).
140. The parties were married and lived in Scotland with the father's parents. After
the parties separated, they both sought custody of their only child, Matthew. While the
custody hearing was pending, the Stranraer Sheriff Court granted interim custody to the
mother, interim access to the father, and ordered that Matthew remain in Scotland
pending the further court order. Before the court entered the final order of custody, the
mother left Scotland to live with her parents in Manitoba, Canada. Id. at 561.
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custody within the meaning of the Convention. 14' However, in dicta, the
court indicated that it would not treat a non-removal clause in a final
order in the same way because such clauses are usually intended to
secure only rights of access that are not afforded as much protection as
rights of custody. 142 Therefore, Canada would not adhere to the
decisions of its sister signatories. 1
43
IV. Why the Supreme Court Should Have Granted Certiorari to Affirm
the Decision of the Eleventh Circuit
Ms. Reeves appealed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit to the
Supreme Court of the U.S.; however, the Court denied her petition for
certiorari. 144 One can only speculate as to why the Court denied Ms.
Reeves's petition, but it may have had something to do with the Court's
reluctance to hear domestic relations cases. 45  Despite the Court's
reasons for denying Ms. Reeves's petition, the decision not to hear the
case significantly affected the status of the Convention and will most
certainly have an effect on the way in which the U.S., and possibly some
of its sister signatories, interpret the Convention in the future. It will also
impact the lives of both abducting and "left-behind" parents who will
face Hague Convention litigation. To alleviate some of these potential
problems, the Supreme Court should have granted the petition for
certiorari and should ultimately have decided that a ne exeat right
constitutes a right of custody within the meaning of the Convention.
141. The court concluded that because the court had before it the issue of child
custody and because it awarded interim custody to one of the parents, in the course of
dealing with the issue of custody, the court had rights "relating to the care and control of
the child" under the Convention. Specifically, the court had the right to determine the
child's place of residence. Id. at 588. Thus, a court is an "institution or any other body"
that may hold rights of custody within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
Convention, supra note 9, at art. 3.
142. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 589.
143. At least one French court determined that a custody order requiring the mother to
raise her children in England and Wales did not constitute custody rights for the father
because it would infringe on the mother's right to expatriate. This court did not
specifically address the meaning of "right to determine the child's place of residence"
under Article 5 of the Convention. It focused more on the right to expatriate under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
See T.G.I. Periguex, Mar. 17, 1992, Ministere Public v. Mme. Y., D.S. Jur. 1992 (Fr.).
144. Reeves v. Fumes, 125 S. Ct. 478 (2004).
145. Federal courts have a rule of abstention in domestic relations cases. The Court
determined that such a rule exists as a matter of statutory construction of the Judiciary
Act of 1789. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). Federal courts are out of
their realm when asked to adjudicate a Hague Convention case. They are essentially
family law disputes, an area of law usually reserved for state courts. Merle H. Weiner,
Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need For Purposive
Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 282 (2002) [hereinafter Weiner Article].
2005]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
A. Uniformity of Interpretation
Although the decision of the Eleventh Circuit diverges from the
weight of authority in the U.S., 146 it conforms to the majority of decisions
from other signatory courts addressing the ne exeat clause issue
directly. 147 One of the reasons that the Supreme Court should have both
granted certiorari and concluded that a ne exeat right constitutes a right
of custody within the meaning of the Convention is that doing so would
have helped fulfill a desire for uniformity that exists with regard to treaty
interpretation. 148 Uniformity of interpretation provides guidance for not
only Contracting States' judicial or administrative systems that
adjudicate Convention litigation, but also to individuals who are faced
with a custody situation that has the potential for coming under the ambit
of the Convention. 149 Affirming the decision of the Eleventh Circuit
would have been in accord with the weight of majority among other
signatories and thus would have contributed to the effectiveness and
strength of the Convention.
Support for the argument that the Supreme Court should have
affirmed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit to provide uniformity
comes from many angles. Commentators, courts of sister signatories,
and even the U.S. Congress agree that only with uniformity of
interpretation can the Convention achieve significant success.1 50  To
achieve this much needed uniformity, the judicial and administrative
authorities responsible for adjudicating Convention cases must look to
prior case law that addresses the issue at hand. This is especially true
with respect to the U.S. federal courts.' 5' Considering and giving
146. See e.g., Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v.
Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
147. "Our reasoning and conclusions are in harmony with the majority of the courts
of our sister signatories that have addressed this treaty issue." Fumes, 362 F.3d at 717.
See e.g., C v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng. C.A. 1989); Sonderup v. Tondelli, 2000(1)
Constitutional Court of South Africa 1171 (CC); In the Marriage of: Jose Garcia Resina
Appellant/Husband and Muriel Ghislaine Henriette Resina Respondent/Wife, [No. 52]
(1991) (Austl. Fam.); C.C. (T.A.) 2898/92.
148. Croll, 229 F.3d at 150 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
149. Individuals need stable rules to structure their family relationships. They need a
uniform Hague Convention so that they know whether they can move abroad with a child
or children without the consent of the other parent or whether they would have access to
the return remedy should their child be taken without consent. See Weiner Article, supra
note 145 at 291.
150. See e.g., id. at 282-91; C. v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng. C.A. 1989) (Lord Donaldson
of Lymington, Mr., concurring) (noting that the whole purpose of such a code "is to
produce a situation in which the courts of all contracting states may be expected to
interpret and apply it in similar ways"); ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B) ("in
enacting this chapter the Congress recognizes the need for uniform international
interpretation of the Convention").
151. As stated previously, the U.S. federal courts are "fish out of water" with respect
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deference to case law of sister signatories when they have addressed the
relevant issue constitutes a thorough Convention case opinion. 152 The
Eleventh Circuit recognized the need to afford deference to the
conclusions of courts of other signatories; 153 therefore, theirs is the
decision that the Supreme Court should have upheld.
The Supreme Court, had they granted certiorari, should not have
reversed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in favor of following the
Croll majority's decision because such a conclusion would exacerbate
the problems associated with a lack of uniformity. Contrary to the
Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit conducted only a cursory review of
foreign case law because it could not find a consensus among the foreign
courts regarding the ne exeat right issue. 154  However, the courts of
signatories taking the opposite position from the Eleventh Circuit either
did so in dicta or did not squarely address the issue. 5 5 Therefore, a clear
majority emerges from foreign case law. The Croll majority's
unwillingness to follow the weight of authority amongst its sister
signatories weakens the Convention' 56 and aggravates the problems
related to a deficiency of uniformity. For example, without a uniform
interpretation of the Convention, abductors may be encouraged to
abduct, believing that they can take the child to a jurisdiction with a more
favorable interpretation thereby avoiding sanction. 57  Ultimately, the
Supreme Court would have strengthened the Convention and resolved
the split of authority in the U.S. by affirming the harmonious decisions of
the Eleventh Circuit and foreign case law.
B. Fulfilling the Purposes of the Convention
Another reason the Supreme Court should have decided that ne
exeat rights constitute rights of custody is because such a decision would
fulfill the purposes of the Convention. The first stated objective of the
to domestic relations issues. Usually, such cases are referred to the state courts because
of their expertise in that area of law. This inexperience suggests a need to look elsewhere
for guidance in interpreting the Convention. Weiner Article, supra note 145, at 282-84.
152. Id. at 281. It can even serve as a canon of construction. Id. at 287. Uniform and
sophisticated interpretation will evolve only with the exchange and consideration of other
views. PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAvY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 238 (P.B. Carter ed., Oxford University Press 1999).
153. "In interpreting the language of treaties, 'we find the opinions of our sister
signatories to be entitled to considerable weight."' Fumes, 362 F.3d at 717.
154. "Foreign courts are split on the issue presented in this case." Croll, 229 F.3d at
143.
155. See, e.g., Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 589 (Can.); T.G.I. Periguex, Mar. 17,
1992, Ministere Public v. Mme. Y., D.S. Jur. 1992 (Fr.).
156. Weiner Article, supra note 145, at 279.
157. Id. at 289.
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Convention is listed in the preamble-to protect children internationally
from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention.158 This
objective has been described as both a desire to restore the status quo
59
and to prevent the international removal of children "to secure a more
favorable forum for the adjudication of custody rights."'' 60 The terms and
provisions of the Convention must be read to give effect to these
purposes. 161 Interpreting ne exeat rights as conferring rights of custody
within the meaning of the Convention gives effect to restoring the status
quo and protecting children from international removal. If a non-
custodial parent's right to give or withhold consent to the child moving
abroad was not viewed as a right of custody, the abducting parent would
easily be able to upset the status quo without any threat of repercussions.
Some argue that rights of custody are not to be read so broadly to
include ne exeat rights.' 62 However, the terms of the Convention favor a
flexible interpretation to allow "the greatest possible number of cases to
be brought into consideration"'163 and to "protect all the ways in which
custody can be exercised."' 64 This is reflected in the open-ended nature
of the definition of "rights of custody" in Article 5 of the Convention.
165
Using this broad and flexible interpretation, a ne exeat right, or a right to
give or withhold consent to the child moving abroad, is a right of
custody. In particular, it is the right to "determine the child's place of
residence" within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention.166 To read
the Convention narrowly, and thus conclude that the return remedy is
unavailable to an individual with a ne exeat right, would "allow
abducting parents to undermine the very purpose of the Convention."'
167
158. Convention, supra note 8, at preamble.
159. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 10, at 429.
160. Croll, 229 F.3d at 137 (citing Blondin v. DuBois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir.
1999).
161. See C. v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng. C.A. 1989) (noting that "the Convention must
be interpreted so that within its scope it is to be effective").
162. "The definition of 'rights of custody' in Article 5 at least suggests that the breach
of a right simply to give or to withhold consent to changes in a child's place of residence
is not to be construed as a breach of rights of custody in the sense of Article 3." A.E.
Anton, International Child Abduction, 30 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 537, 546 (1981).
163. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 10, at 446.
164. Id. at 447.
165. See e.g., John M. Eekelaar, International Child Abduction by Parents, 32 U.
TORONTO L.J. 281, 309 (1982); Perez-Vera Report, supra note 11, at 446. See
Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5.
166. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5. See Eekelaar, supra note 165, at 310 (when a
court specifically stated that a child should not be removed from the jurisdiction without
the consent of one parent, a parent's removal of the child would be wrongful because it
would violate the other parent's right to determine the child's place of residence).
167. Croll, 229 F.3d at 147 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Additionally, a ne exeat right
creates more power than a mere veto power. It gives an otherwise non-custodial access
parent the power, and hence the right to impose specific conditions. Christopher B.
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The Supreme Court should have committed to protecting children from
international removal and restoring the status quo by holding that ne
exeat rights are rights of custody.
The other main objective of the Convention is to "ensure that rights
of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively respected in the other Contracting States."'' 68 Especially with
regard to the rights of the parties in Fumes v. Reeves, it follows that in
order to carry out this objective, ne exeat rights must be interpreted as
granting rights of custody within the meaning of the Convention.
Under the agreement that Mr. Fumes and Ms. Reeves reached, they
would both maintain "joint parental responsibility" for Jessica under
Norwegian Law. 169 Section 30 of the Norwegian Children Act provides
that individuals with such responsibility "have the right and the duty to
make decisions for the child in personal matters."' 170 However, because
the agreement granted Ms. Reeves physical custody of Jessica, Mr.
Fumes's rights were limited. As the "non-custodial" parent, Mr. Fumes
could not interfere with any of Ms. Reeves's decisions relating to
important aspects of Jessica's care (emphasis added).' 71 This did not
mean that Mr. Fumes gave up all of his rights. Because the parties had
joint parental responsibility of Jessica, both of them had to consent to the
child moving abroad. 72  Therefore, Mr. Fumes's right to give or
withhold consent to Jessica moving abroad was a right to make a
decision for the child in personal matters under Norwegian law. These
rights can be equated with the Convention's definition of "rights of
custody" or "rights relating to the care of the person of the child."'
' 73
Thus, the U.S. must respect Mr. Fumes's rights of custody under
Norwegian law. 174 Unfortunately, this would not have been the case had
Mr. Fumes's petition been heard in the Second, Fourth, or Ninth Circuit
Whitman, Croll v. Croll: The Second Circuit Limits "Custody Rights " Under the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 9 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 605, 625 (2001). A ne exeat right grants an individual the decision making
authority to ensure that the child speak the language of the state of habitual residence,
learn and participate in its culture, and attend its schools. Fumes, 362 F.3d at 716.
168. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1. The remaining stated objective of the
Convention, "to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained
in any Contracting State," relates more to the procedures that the Convention and
Contracting States have implemented.
169. Fumes, 362 F.3d at 706.
170. Norwegian Children Act, No. 3, § 30.
171. These decisions include whether the child shall attend a day-care center, where
in Norway the child shall live and other major decisions concerning everyday life.
Norwegian Children Act, § 35b.
172. Norwegian Children Act, § 43.
173. Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5.
174. This analysis and reasoning was also put forth by the Eleventh Circuit. See
Fumes, 362 F.3d at 713-14.
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Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari
and resolved the circuit split in favor of the decision of the Eleventh
Circuit so that parents like Ms. Reeves cannot attempt to "[circumvent]
the home country's custody law" by removing the child to a jurisdiction
with more favorable laws. 
175
Even though this may seem like an "as applied" analysis, 176 ne exeat
rights should be interpreted as granting rights of custody as a general
rule. This is because ne exeat clauses arise out of either a "judicial or
administrative decision" or an "agreement having legal effect" under the
law of the home state. 177 If a court were to interpret a ne exeat clause as
not conferring rights of custody, the decision would essentially disrespect
the law of a sister signatory by denying the "left-behind" parent's right to
determine the child's place of residence.
V. Conclusion
There is currently a split amongst the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals over an issue that has been addressed with increasing frequency
over the past five years 178-whether a ne exeat clause, or a clause
granting the right to give or withhold consent to a child moving abroad,
grants an individual "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
179
The U.S. Supreme Court had the chance to resolve the split, but it
unfortunately chose not to hear the case. 180 The most recent U.S.
decision, from the Eleventh Circuit in Fumes v. Reeves, concluded that
ne exeat rights constitute rights of custody, making Ms. Reeves's
removal of the parties' daughter to the U.S. from Norway wrongful
within the meaning of the Convention. 81  This decision accords with
175. Croll, 229 F.3d at 149 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
176. "As applied" meaning that the analysis looks specifically at the Fumes v. Reeves
fact scenario as opposed to a more general analysis.
177. These are two ways under the Convention in which rights of custody arise.
Convention, supra note 8, at art. 3b. See also Fumes, 362 F.3d at 706 (ne exeat right
arose out of the agreement the parties reached which was approved by a Norwegian court
that granted the parties "joint parental responsibilities" under Norwegian law); Croll, 229
F.3d at 135 (ne exeat fight arose out of a custody order issued by the Hong Kong court);
C. v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng. C.A. 1989) (ne exeat right arose out of a consent order made
by the deputy registrar in Sydney, Australia, the state of habitual residence).
178. See, e.g., Fumes, 362 F.3d 702; Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir.
2003); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133
(2d Cir. 2000).
179. See Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
180. Reeves v. Fumes, docket no. 04-157, cert. denied, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/110804pzor.pdf (last visited Sept. 17,
2005).
181. Fumes, 362 F.3d at 724.
[Vol. 24:2
WHAT GIVES YOU THE RIGHT?!
those from courts of sister signatories to the Convention. 182
After brief overviews of the texts of the Convention and
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, the U.S.' Convention-
implementing legislation,' 83 this Comment has proposed that the U.S.
Supreme Court should have granted Ms. Reeves's petition for certiorari
to settle the law regarding ne exeat rights in the U.S. Additionally, the
Court should have resolved the split of authority by concluding that ne
exeat rights grant the individual holding them with rights of custody
under the terms of the Convention. This would have been the just and
right decision for the Court to make for two reasons.
First, it would have been harmonious with the majority of foreign
case law, leading to a uniform interpretation of the Convention.
Uniformity is needed to guide both the judicial and administrative
authorities charged with adjudicating Convention cases and individuals
who are affected by the terms of the Convention by being either an
abducting or "left-behind" parent. Second, such a conclusion would
have fulfilled the purposes of the Convention. 84 Recognizing a ne exeat
right as a right of custody, thus affording the "left-behind" parent the
return remedy under the Convention, would restore the status quo and
prevent the international abduction of children.' 85  Additionally, this
interpretation is in conformity with the Convention's flexible
interpretation of "rights of custody,', 186 ensureing that rights of custody
under the law of one Contracting State are respected in other Contracting
States. 187
Ultimately, the fate of the ne exeat clause in the U.S. is still
unstable. Until the Supreme Court grants certiorari on this issue, "left-
behind" parents with ne exeat rights will be at the mercy of the abducting
parent. He or she will ultimately decide whether the abducted child will
have to return to the state of habitual residence by removing the child to
either a U.S. jurisdiction that does or does not recognize ne exeat rights
as rights of custody.
182. See e.g., C. v. C., 1 W.L.R. 654 (Eng. C.A. 1989); Sonderup v. Tondelli, 2000(1)
Constitutional Court of South Africa 1171 (CC); In the Marriage of: Jose Garcia Resina
Appellant/Husband and Muriel Ghislaine Henriette Resina Respondent/Wife, [No. 52]
(1991) (Austl. Fam.); C.C. (T.A.) 2898/92.
183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (2002).
184. See Convention, supra note 8, at preamble, art. 1.
185. See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 10, at 429, 435.
186. Id. at 446.
187. Convention, supra note 8, at art. lb.
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